Testing Dynamic Oligopolistic Interaction: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

This paper analyzes the impact of a dynamic specification on the estimation of the conduct parameter in an oligopolistic market. Various empirical studies have shown that in the semiconductor industry, in particular in the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) market, one has to account for dynamic elements as learning-by-doing within firms and learning spillovers among them. Therefore this market seems to be appropriate to investigate whether firms behave strategically in a dynamic sense and how open-loop or closed-loop as equilibrium concepts alter the size of the estimated parameters. I apply a structural oligopolistic model of dynamic nonprice competition that incorporates learning-by-doing and spillovers. Theory shows that learning-by-doing and learning spillovers have important consequences for firm behavior. Whether firms in the DRAM industry take the strategic effects of learning-by-doing and learning spillovers actually into account when choosing their output strategies, is answered with empirical evidence. Using quarterly data from 1974-1996 at the firm level, I estimate demand and pricing relations for three different generations of DRAM chips. The empirical results show that the game theoretic specification has an important impact and that firms behave strategically. The assumption of an open-loop specification would underestimate the conduct parameter on average about 50%. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Testen dynamischer oligopolistischer Interaktion: Empirische Evidenz aus der Halbleiterindustrie) In diesem Arbeitspapier wird der Einfluß einer dynamischen Spezifikation auf die Schätzung des Verhaltensparameters in einem oligopolistischen Marktes untersucht. Verschiedene empirische Studien haben gezeigt, daß die Halbleiterindustrie, im speziellen der Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Markt, von dynamischen Elementen wie Learning-by-doing in Unternehmen und Learning spillovers zwischen Unternehmen geprägt ist. Das wirft die Frage auf, ob sich Unternehmen in einem dynamischen Sinne strategisch verhalten und wie open-loop beziehungsweise closed-loop als Gleichgewichtskonzepte die Größe der geschätzten Parameter verändern. In diesem Papier wird ein strukturelles oligopolistisches Modell in einem dynamischen Kontext betrachtet, indem Unternehmen Mengen setzten und Learning-by-doing und Learning spillovers relevant sind. Die Theorie zeigt, daß Learning-by-doing und Learning spillovers wichtige Konsequenzen für das Verhalten von Unternehmen haben. Ob die Unternehmen in der DRAM Industrie tatsächlich die strategischen Effekte aus Learning-by-doing und Learning spillovers in Betracht ziehen, wird auf empirische Weise versucht zu beantworten. Unter der Verwendung vierteljährlicher firmenspezifischer Daten der Jahre 1974-1996 werden die Nachfrage- und die Angebotsgleichung für drei Generationen von DRAMs geschätzt. Die Schätzergebnisse zeigen, daß die spieltheoretische Spezifikation einen wichtigen Einfluß hat und daß sich Unternehmen strategisch in einem dynamischen Sinne verhalten. So unterschätzt die Annahme einer open-loop Gleichgewichtslösung den Verhaltensparameter im Durchschnitt um 50% unterschätzen.Oligopoly; dynamic games; semiconductor industry

Econometric Analysis of Cattle Auctions

This paper provides an empirical analysis of cattle auctions taking place in Amstetten, Austria. The particular auctions we focus on are ascending or English auctions. In this market the sellers are usually farmers and the buyers are either farmers as well or resale trade firms. A further characteristic of this market are two large bidders, each representing a resale trade firm. As all important characteristics of the cattle are known the independent private value model is adopted. The parameters that characterize the distribution of bidders’ unobserved private values are then estimated using a simulated nonlinear least square estimator. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Ökonometrische Analyse von Rinderauktionen) In diesem Aufsatz wird eine empirische Analyse von Rinderauktionen im Amstetten, Österreich, beschrieben. Es werden vor allem Englische Auktionen analysiert. In diesem Markt sind Verkäufer üblicherweise Bauern und Käufer entweder Bauern oder Repräsentanten von Handelsfirmen. Eine weitere Charakteristik des Marktes in Amstetten sind jene zwei Händler, die je ein Handelsunternehmen repräsentieren sowie einen relativ großen Marktanteil besitzen. Da alle wichtigen Merkmale der Rinder bekannt sind, kann das "independent private value" Modell angewandt werden. Jene Parameter, die die Verteilung der nicht beobachtbaren "private values" der Bieter charakterisieren, werden mittels simulierter nichtlinearer Kleinste-Quadrat-Schätzer berechnet.applied econometrics; English auctions; private values

Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions

The objectives of this study are to investigate the institutional speci¯cs of sequential cattle auctions and their role as determinants of prices. Institutional speci¯cs are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price, bidders' multi-unit demand and di®erent types of bidders. Prices decline and bidders with a higher demand pay on average lower prices. The estimation results show that declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret reserve price. The results further show that bidders take the strategic e®ect of sequential auctions and multi-unit demand into account.

Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?

According to Becker's (1957) famous theory on discrimination, entrepreneurs with a strong prejudice against female workers forgo profits by submitting to their tastes. In a competitive market their firms lack efficiency and are therefore forced to leave. We present new empirical evidence for this prediction by studying the survival of startup firms in a large longitudinal matched employer-employee data set from Austria. Our results show that firms with strong preferences for discrimination, i.e. a low share of female employees relatively to the industry average, have significantly shorter survival rates. This is especially relevant for firms starting out with female shares in the lower tail of the distribution. They exit about 18 months earlier than firms with a median share of females. We see no differences in survival between firms at the top of the female share distribution and at the median, though. We further document that highly discriminatory firms that manage to survive submit to market powers and increase their female workforce over time.firm survival, profitability, female employment, discrimination, market test, matched employer-employee data

Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms

In this paper we investigate the relationship between females among the first hires of start-up companies and business success. Our results show that firms with female first hires have a higher share of female workers at the end of the first year after entry. Further, we find that firms with female first hires are more successful and stay longer in the market. We conclude that our results support the hypothesis that gender-diversity in leading positions is an advantage for start-up firms.Firm survival, profitability, female employment, discrimination, market test, matched employer-employee data

Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?

According to Becker's (1957) famous theory on discrimination, entrepreneurs with a strong prejudice against female workers forgo profits by submitting to their tastes. In a competitive market their firms lack efficiency and are therefore forced to leave. We present new empirical evidence for this prediction by studying the survival of startup firms in a large longitudinal matched employer-employee data set from Austria. Our results show that firms with strong preferences for discrimination, i.e. a low share of female employees relatively to the industry average, have significantly shorter survival rates. This is especially relevant for firms starting out with female shares in the lower tail of the distribution. They exit about 18 months earlier than firms with a median share of females. We see no differences in survival between firms at the top of the female share distribution and at the median, though. We further document that highly discriminatory firms that manage to survive submit to market powers and increase their female workforce over time.Firm survival, profitability, female employment, discrimination, market test, matched employer-employee data

Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms

In this paper we investigate the relationship between females among the first hires of start-up companies and business success. Our results show that firms with female first hires have a higher share of female workers at the end of the first year after entry. Further, we find that firms with female first hires are more successful and stay longer in the market. We conclude that our results support the hypothesis that gender-diversity in leading positions is an advantage for start-up firms.Firm survival, profitability, female employment, discrimination, market test, matched employer-employee data

Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms

In this paper we investigate the relationship between females among the first hires of start-up companies and business success. Our results show that firms with female first hires have a higher share of female workers at the end of the first year after entry. Further, we find that firms with female first hires are more successful and stay longer in the market. We conclude that our results support the hypothesis that gender-diversity in leading positions is an advantage for start-up firms.firm survival, profitability, female employment, discrimination, market test, matched employer-employee data

Auctions - A Survey

The importance of auction theory has gained increased recognition in the scientific community, the latest recognition being the award of the Nobel price to Vickrey and Mirrlees. Auction theory has been used in quite different fields, both theoretically and empirically. This paper connects recent developments in theoretical and empirical works, providing a survey about theoretical, empirical, and experimental results.Auction Theory, Information and Uncertainty, Asymmetric and Private Information

Essays in empirical industrial economics

Diese Dissertation besteht aus zwei Teilen, die durch eine Einleitung zu Auktions- und Oligopolmärkten und durch eine kurze Diskussion über die erzielten Resultate am Ende der Arbeit miteinander verbunden sind. Der erste Teil diskutiert die Literatur zu Auktionen und analysiert das Verhalten von Bietern in Österreichischen Rinderauktionen. Das Ziel der Untersuchung ist es zu bestimmen, ob es Unterschiede im Verhalten der Bieter gibt und ob diese die Möglichkeit eines späteren Kaufes in Betracht ziehen. Der zweite Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Strategien von Firmen in der Halbleiterindustrie. Im besonderen werden die strategischen Effekte von "learning-by-doing" und "spillovers" betrachtet. Des weiteren werden die Konsequenzen der Aggregation von firmenspezifischen Preisverhalten zu einer industriespezifischen Presigleichung empirisch untersucht. In beiden Teilen wird schwerpunktmäßig auf der Frage eingegangen, ob das Vernachlässigen von Asymmetrien unter den Marktteilnehmern und/oder das Vernachlässigen dynamischer Effekte die geschätzen Parameter beeinflußt.This thesis consists of two parts, which are connected by an introduction on auction and oligopoly markets and a short discussion about the obtained results at the end. The first part provides a literature review on auctions and analyzes bidders' behavior in Austrian cattle auctions. The aim is to investigate whether there are differences among bidders and whether bidders take the possibility of buying later into account when bidding for objects. The second part analyzes firms' strategies in the semiconductor industry. In particular, the strategic effects of learning-by-doing and spillovers are considered. Further, the consequences of aggregating firms' pricing behavior to an industry level pricing equation are empirically investigated. In both parts emphasis is put on the question, whether neglecting asymmetries across market participants and/or neglecting dynamic effects influences the estimated parameters